2023-11-17 00:26:20
Every Friday, Guardian columnist and former Washington correspondent, Jonathan Freedland, invites experts to help analyse the latest in American politics. From politicians to journalists covering the White House and beyond, Jonathan and his guests give listeners behind the scenes access to how the American political machine works.
This is The Guardian.
On Wednesday, the United Nations Security Council voted for a resolution calling for
a humanitarian pause in Gaza and for the release of all the Israeli hostages held by Hamas.
Now, if Israel fails to comply, it will be in violation of the resolution,
as well as international humanitarian law.
The United States and the UK abstained on the resolution,
saying they couldn't give it their full support because it did not explicitly criticize Hamas.
We've been clear at the highest levels, Hamas's actions do not
lessen Israel's responsibility to protect innocent people in Gaza.
Joe Biden is facing growing criticism at home, on the left, from some Democrats,
and even from staff in his own administration, all of them demanding that he call for a ceasefire,
something the president has said isn't for now a possibility.
But what do voters think, especially those with the closest ties to this conflict?
How do Jewish Americans and Arab Americans view
the president's response to the 7th of October attacks?
Is his stance winning over some voters or losing them?
I'm Jonathan Friedland, columnist at The Guardian,
and this is Politics Weekly America.
I worked for 21 years at The New York Times.
Most relevant to our conversation, I was the Jerusalem bureau chief for four years
covering Israel and the Palestinian conflict.
Jodi Rudoran is the editor-in-chief of The Forward,
a digital news organization aimed primarily at a Jewish American audience.
We thought we knew the contours of this conflict.
We thought we'd seen this movie many times before,
but we saw on October 7th, and we've seen over and over since then,
this is paradigm shattering what's happening now, what happened on October 7th.
And because our focus on this podcast is particularly about the politics of the United States,
did you have a sense then of how the paradigm might have shifted in terms of America's
relationship with the region, with Israel and the Palestinians?
And did you have a sense of what you thought Joe Biden would do in response
and what you felt he should do in response?
Very quickly, I think on the Sunday, on the Monday, as we started to understand the dynamics
of how exactly this had come to be, including the intelligence failures,
I think it was pretty clear that there was an American role in that,
in the sense that the focus on the regional deals, the Abraham Accords,
so-called Abraham Accords, that had been a Trump administration focus
and that Biden had kind of picked up on.
And the talks that the Biden administration was engaging in with Saudi Arabia
about doing a deal with Israel, those things that had all taken,
basically ignored the Palestinian problem, I do think were a significant factor
in leading Hamas to take this radical turn.
It was not a surprise for Biden or any American president to stand by Israel
and its right to defend itself, but I would say the full-throatedness of that support.
Israel has the right to defend itself and its people, full stop.
There's never justification for terrorist attacks.
And my administration's support for Israel's security is rock solid and unwavering.
The very quick movement of American battleships to back up Israel
in case of further threats from other parts of the region,
those things were also surprises.
And then I would say the other major set of surprises that have cascaded
over the last few weeks that could have influence on American politics,
we underestimated the extent to which the left in the United States had moved on Israel.
We sort of knew it had moved.
The dynamic had changed in the halls of Congress,
and we knew it had moved on college campuses,
but the extent of its movement in the open public discourse has been a surprise.
Just on Biden and the extent to which you said the full-throatedness was
something you might not have anticipated.
But let's go back to, as it were, October the 6th
and where Biden stood in terms of Jewish Americans.
How would you characterize the relationship Joe Biden had
with American Jews before this event?
The vast majority of American Jews are Democrats.
I'd say liberal Democrats, but not far-left Democrats.
Something like 70% of American Jews voted for President Biden.
That was a strong showing, but not an inconsistent-with-history showing.
And I would say Biden got a little help by the fact that most American Jews,
aside from a relatively small, mostly Orthodox Republican faction,
were pretty horrified by President Trump, and particularly by January 6th.
So his vice president has a Jewish husband.
His children are almost all married to Jews.
So he has a lot of...
First of all, his politics align with American Jewish mainstream politics,
which are Democratic.
And he has a little bit of a Yiddishkite connection with American Jews.
There's some love there.
And there's this great line that is always said, isn't there,
that he feels this connection in his kishkes, a Yiddish word for his guts.
He loves to throw in a little Jewish touch.
And there's a rabbi in Delaware that he has a close relationship with.
And he knows American Jews as an important part of his political constituency.
He understands us, I think.
During the Obama administration, when Joe Biden was vice president,
he was really the main interlocutor for Israel,
the main holder of the U.S.-Israel relationship.
Obama was not as trusted an American connection as Joe Biden was.
He also has a long relationship with Netanyahu, the prime minister of Israel now.
But that relationship had been very, very strained over the last year,
with this current government that was installed in Israel just about a year ago,
which is, as you know, the most radical right-wing extremist government in Israel's history.
And Biden had been cool towards Netanyahu and Israel during this protest movement.
He had not invited him to the White House as readily as in prior administrations.
And so that relationship was a little on ice.
And everything changed on October 7th.
Not only did all of that fade into the background,
but as I said, Biden stepped up with a kind of full-throated support for Israel
that we really have not seen in a long time.
As the war has gone on, there has been some pressure
on Joe Biden to, in a way, dial down his support for Israel.
As the civilian death toll in Gaza climbed,
one senior administration official says that it has created, quote, a great moral anxiety.
You've seen some 500 political appointees, staff within his administration,
putting pen to paper and criticizing, in a letter presented to his cabinet,
criticizing the extent of the support,
suggesting that there needs to be some restraint imposed on Israel by the White House.
And there have been reports periodically that Joe Biden, his secretary of state, Tony Blinken,
they are urging the Israelis to limit, in that dread phrase,
the collateral damage of their military offensive in Gaza.
We have to rise to that responsibility.
And so we will be talking about concrete steps.
That can and should be taken to minimize harm to men, women and children in Gaza.
I mean, what are American Jews making of that?
Are they with Joe Biden or are they with the letter writers and the people who are saying,
you know, this has perhaps gone too far?
I think that most American Jews are grappling with this is a really complicated situation.
You know, Israel was attacked in a brutal and barbaric way.
And the idea of responding in a way that whose goals are to root out
Hamas makes a lot of sense, but it is an unrealistic military goal.
And it makes sense also that we are worried about the collateral damage.
So I think, you know, the right place for America to be
is to be supporting Israel in its response and in its self-defense
while doing whatever it can to keep Gaza.
I mean, I think Gaza is in a humanitarian crisis, but to manage that humanitarian crisis.
So Washington has to play a role in pushing Israel to
prosecute this war in the most humanitarian way possible.
And to what extent do you see a generational dimension of this?
I'm thinking of those images that I saw of young Jewish activists
wearing T-shirts and Jewish voice for peace in Grand Central Station in New York,
protesting, demanding a ceasefire.
This could work on two levels, that there's a generational divide inside American Jewry
with more young people feeling less supportive of Israel in its fight against Hamas.
But also there's a generational divide, perhaps, that you see
in the Democratic Party itself with younger Democrats.
And I think you touched on this earlier, talking about the left,
but with where younger Democrats are more skeptical of Israel, less supportive of Israel.
Is this a generational divide that runs through
both American Jewry and also the American Democratic Party?
Yes, 100 percent.
I would say maybe I would even add a third piece to that.
I mean, I think it's definitely a generational divide within American Jewry.
It's a generational divide within the Democratic Party or Democratic constituencies
and a generational divide just broadly, just broadly on the, you know,
people who might not even identify as Democrats.
There was a lot of polling before October 7th showing real shifts by generation in terms of
support when you're asked, when people are asked,
do you support the Israelis or the Palestinians more?
The younger generation tilts towards Palestinians in significantly higher numbers.
And when you ask American Jews in the younger generation,
just about their general connection to Israel,
it is much, much lower in the younger generations.
I think there's a number of factors to that.
I mean, one is simply the distance from the founding of the state of Israel,
from the need for a safe haven from the Holocaust, etc.
Just, you know, it's been 75 years.
The second factor, I think, is this occupation of the West Bank that was declared to be temporary,
has passed its 50-year mark and does not feel temporary to anybody who is grown up with it
as a increasingly permanent-seeming occupation and including many,
many civil rights and human rights violations.
And the third is that this generation really is focused on a politics that is about
human rights, a framing of politics that is very focused on colonization, racial dynamics,
and movements focused on racial identities and intersectionality
has defined the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within that framework.
I do not think that framework is relevant to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
or at least not in the simplistic way it has been sold to the younger generation on the left.
But that is the framing that they have grown up
seeing on their social media feeds and on their college campuses.
You've told us how loyal American Jews have been to the Democratic Party,
one of the most solid voting blocs for Democrats going back decades.
Any sense of how all of this might affect how Jewish Americans vote in November 2024?
Well, first of all, just historically, Israel has mattered very, very little
in American Jews' voting decisions.
Every poll has shown that very few Jewish Americans think about
the Israel policy of who they're voting for at all.
That makes a lot of sense, right?
We live in the United States.
We care about things like health care and education and abortion rights and whatever.
And our Jewish identities are only part of our identities as American voters.
And within our Jewish identities, Israel is only one factor.
The main factor in our decisions about who to vote for in November
is based on how we feel about our own economic situation about three weeks before.
That is what matters.
Look, there's a year of campaign to go until our presidential election.
And a lot of things can happen during those campaigns.
And it's not just about who shows up and who they vote for on election day.
It's also about who makes endorsements, who raises money,
what happens in congressional primaries, where the pro-Israel lobby is very, very active.
So there are some ways in which this issue may affect the dynamics of the campaign.
But if you ask me, do I think that large numbers of Jewish American voters,
as they are casting their ballot for president a year from now,
will be focused mainly on October 7th and the aftermath?
My answer is no.
Analysts suspect that for Arab Americans,
Biden's response will have a lasting impact on how they vote.
And as a Democrat, I've been on the Democratic National Committee for 30 years.
It's worrisome because I think we'll have fallout in other areas as well.
Dr. James Zogby is the founder of the Arab American Institute,
a national civil rights advocacy organization.
Well, we began in 1985, coming out of the Jesse Jackson campaign,
which was the first presidential campaign to welcome Arab Americans by name.
There had been Syrian and Lebanese involvement in previous campaigns.
But Arab American was sort of verboten.
Political parties wouldn't meet with us.
And then Jackson comes along and the community was so empowered.
We decided to institutionalize that in 85 with a project that would both
encourage Arab Americans to vote, get them involved in the political parties,
and then from that sort of bring our issues into the political realm.
People often note when they talk about Arab Americans as a voting
bloc, that it is a relatively small population.
But in certain states, and particularly the one always people pick on is Michigan.
More than 300,000 Americans from the Middle East call Michigan home.
A state President Biden flipped in 2020 after Donald Trump won in 2016 by just 11,000 votes.
And the town there of Dearborn, Michigan, in particular, there is
a large community there, which means it can actually be a
crucial bloc in what is a crucial must win state in presidential elections.
So just give us a sense of how before October the 7th,
if you like, Arab Americans viewed Joe Biden.
We've been doing polling on this every other year,
sometimes every year, for the last 27 years.
And the community, like most other ethnic groups, Irish, Italian, Polish,
who'd come over here a century or more ago, have leaned democratic.
That was their history in labor, in small business, immigration reform, etc.
And then they began to become a little more prosperous and drift Republican,
but always leaned Democratic.
That shifted with the Bush era.
The gap opened up, and it opened first to eight points, and then it went to double digits.
And then by the time you get to 2008, it's almost two to one Democratic,
54% registered Democrat, 27% Republican.
And this is the post 9-11 period, the so-called war on terror,
in which Arab Americans would have felt in some ways besieged.
So George Bush said, don't judge all Arabs.
The war against terrorism is not a war against Muslims, nor is it a war against Arabs.
It's a war against evil people.
But his administration did, and it took a toll.
And it wasn't just the rhetoric, but it was the Iraq war, and it was the
all of the rest of the rhetoric coming out of the neoconservatives and the far religious right
that shaped policies there.
It stayed two to one for a decade.
And then in the Biden era, the community overwhelmingly voted for him, 59% to,
I think it was like 27% in the 2020 election.
In the poll we did about two or three weeks ago, the numbers dropped into the 20% range.
And would you vote for him in 2024?
The numbers went from 59% down to 17%.
And one of the things we found was that dissatisfaction with his policy on this issue
was across the board.
And it didn't matter whether Lebanese or Syrian, Palestinian, Egyptian,
didn't matter whether Christian, Muslim, whether born here or immigrant.
Like the rest of the country, his numbers have dropped.
But in a very special way, I think over the last month or so, the numbers plummeted.
If you had to pinpoint what it is about Biden's policy that has led to that plunge,
because, you know, we can assume things, but just nail it down for our listeners,
what it is about Biden's stance that has turned off Arab American voters in such huge numbers?
It's partly Biden, but it's more significantly Israel.
The intensity of the bombing, the cavalier attitude toward the civilian casualties,
and seeing the scenes of more than a million people fleeing south.
While I understand completely what happened on October 7th,
traumatized the Jewish community and evoked the Holocaust and the pogroms in Europe.
One has to understand that there is a historical memory that not only Palestinians have,
but the Arabs in general have of those scenes of refugees with nothing but a bag and their kids in
tow fleeing for their lives and never to return. And now seeing the same thing happen again in
our own lives, the respect of the trauma of one people and the ignoring the trauma of another
people is hurtful. John Kirby has not served the president well with his dismissive attitude.
He's the spokesman for the National Security Council.
And it's just, it's shameful, actually.
And obviously what the White House might say is that they have since called, and certainly
State Department, Secretary of State for more restraint from Israel and for a reduction in
the number of civilians killed. Is any of that cutting through with Arab American voters?
No, and it's not because it's at best a timid effort to absolve themselves of crimes that they
have actually enabled. And that's, I think, the general feeling is that it's too little,
too late. You know, and I've been dealing with this issue for 50 years and administrations
since Carter have been telling me, we've urged the Israelis not to do this. We've spoken to
them quietly about not to do it. And, you know, I don't want to point to Ronald Reagan as a hero,
because for God's sake, he's not. But after weeks and weeks of slaughter in Lebanon in 82,
he finally said, stop. The people of Lebanon must have learned that the cycle of massacre
upon massacre must end. Children are not avenged by the murder of other children.
Israel must have learned that there is no way it can impose its own solutions on
hatreds as deep and bitter as those that produce this tragedy. If it seeks to do so,
it will only sink more deeply into the quagmire that looms before it.
You don't give him 14 billion extra dollars as you're requesting. You don't support him at the
United Nations whenever he wants to be supported. Netanyahu can set conditions and we can't set
them back. It's devastating to the president as well as devastating to Palestinians. Devastating
in the sense that people aren't going to support him. And I think it's something that I can't do
anything about. Let's just get to the politics of that. Where those votes will go. I mean,
in your poll, I think 40 percent said they would vote for Donald Trump in 2024, which is a rise of
five percentage points, I think, from 2020 and certainly would be given the pattern you've said
historically has held that would be a high for Arab-American voters. Do you believe that that
when can't come? I mean, we get the anger that's felt now, but 12 months from now, when the choice
is actually Joe Biden versus Donald Trump, do you actually believe that 40 percent of Arab-Americans
community you know so well will actually pull the lever for Donald Trump? Number one, the 40 percent
from the 35 percent from last time or whatever is within the margin of error in a small poll.
So I don't see a huge increase there. What I see, on the other hand, is a plummeting of 42 percent
or 42 points for the president. That's the concerning number here. I've been doing politics
now for almost all my adult life, and I've seen people go to Ralph Nader or Jill Stein or whoever
else was on the ballot and feel clean as opposed to making compromises. Those of us who are older
know there are consequences. But if you're in your 20s, there's a sense that I don't care,
I'm not going to sully myself with this vote. And that has always been a huge challenge for me
in 2016 to go around the country and talk to people about this is not a question of Bernie
Sanders versus Hillary Clinton. It's Hillary Clinton versus Donald Trump. There's no choice
to make. You've got to support Hillary Clinton. If I went and gave that speech now, I'd be booed
off the stage. And I have 50 years of work building credibility with my community, and I'm not going
to risk it when I know that it's a no-win proposition. So you won't actually go out
campaigning for Joe Biden? I can't in conscience do it. My kids wouldn't allow it. My grandkids
wouldn't allow it. And I have to come home and answer to them too. My community is hurt. And
unless the president gives us something, it's going to be fracturing of the Democratic coalition.
So let me fill in that question. What could Joe Biden do now to reverse this shift in the 12
months he has? Well, certainly he could be very firm with Netanyahu about stopping or else.
He could put words and policy to the or else in terms of aid, in terms of support. He could go
to the United Nations and be firm about a censure. He could allow Palestinians to bring what happened
not only on the one side, but on both sides. Hamas and Israel should go before the International
Criminal Court. And then a massive reconstruction plan for Gaza that doesn't rely on Arab money.
We should be rebuilding Gaza and helping people there. Muslim Americans, they're not identical
with Arab Americans, but there's obviously overlap. Do you detect a similar drop off
in support among Muslim Americans for Joe Biden? As people of color, yes. And that's where the
impact is being felt is with Asian, with African-American. One of the largest component
groups of American Muslims are African-American. After that is South Asian Muslims. Arab Muslims
are down in third place in terms of numbers. On the Arab American side, about two thirds are
Christian, one third Muslim. So there is an overlap, but there are different communities
and sometimes with very different concerns. And just to finally sharpen the political question,
we've talked about Michigan. Is it your contention that Joe Biden could lose Michigan over this
and therefore in turn lose the presidency over this issue in 2024? It's very possible and it's
worrisome. But Michigan and Pennsylvania might also be in play as another state where Americans
made a difference, where Arab Americans make a difference. Yes. I'm going to have a very difficult
time mobilizing the community in those states and others in this next election. It's a reality,
a worrisome one. Dr. James Ogbe, thanks so much for joining me on Politics Weekly America.
Thank you. My thanks again also to Jody Rudoran of The Forward. And that is all for this week.
To learn more about the situation on the ground at Gaza's largest hospital, Al-Shifa, since Israel
sent troops in to target Hamas, listen to my colleague Ruth Michelson on our sister podcast
Today in Focus. And in a terrible week for Rishi Sunak's government, do make sure to listen to
Thursday's episode of Politics Weekly UK. The team break down the fallout from the UK Supreme Court's
ruling that the government's Rwanda asylum plan was unlawful, as well as some cabinet and shadow
cabinet comings and goings. So do search for both of those shows wherever you get your podcasts.
But for now, it's goodbye. The producer is Danielle Stevens, the executive producer this
week, Nicole Jackson. I'm Jonathan Friedland. Thanks, as always, for listening.
This is The Guardian.
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