2023-12-05 01:04:46
Listening to America aims to “light out for the territories,” traveling less visited byways and taking time to see this immense, extraordinary country with fresh eyes while listening to the many voices of America’s past, present, and future. Led by noted historian and humanities scholar Clay Jenkinson, Listening to America travels the country’s less visited byways, from national parks and forests to historic sites to countless under-recognized rural and urban places. Through this exploration, Clay and team find and tell the overlooked historical and contemporary stories that shape America’s people and places. Visit our website at ltamerica.org.
Hello everyone and welcome to this edition of Listening to America with Clay Jenkinson. This is the podcast introduction. This week, Lindsay Chervinsky and I talked about 10 things around the Louisiana purchase. This is one of my favorite subjects, turns out.
She knows a lot about it, too, and we wanted to talk about this extraordinary moment. In 1803, when the Jefferson administration doubled the size of our republic for three cents per acre, adding 828,000 square miles and 575 million acres, it was the greatest land sale in human history. It was, in a sense, the making moment of America's continental destiny, if you want to use that loaded term.
I know this sounds horrible, but in buying the Louisiana territory, we were effectively buying the lives of the native people who lived in it. You know, the hundreds of thousands of people living in those states that were eventually carved out of the Louisiana purchase, you know, Apache and Comanche and Cheyenne, and Osage and Pawnee and Mandan, Hidatsa, Arikra, Lakota Dakota, Blackfeet, Crow, Shoshone, et cetera. And when Lewis and Clark went on their historic journey, you know, and that's one of my absolutely central interests in life. They gave these speeches to the natives, and Lewis wrote the speech out, so there were probably variations on it, but we know what it was, and it was delivered very slowly. Because it would be a sentence in English that had to be translated over a series of language barriers until it reached the language of the native peoples, where it probably was garbled, et cetera. But what Lewis essentially said was We're here, we're the future. Your relations with a European derived. People must now be with us, and not the Spanish, the French, the Russians or the English. that we don't come to purchase any land we've purchased first right to negotiate with you for land sessions. And you must not treat with any other entity except the United States government. The Great Father.
And but the moment we don't want any land, we've got plenty of land. We're here to establish a trade relationship and to encourage you to live in peace. Peace with us, peace with other European derived peoples, and, above all, peace with each other. That war is a bad thing. If you will just all agree to live under the security umbrella of the United States, all will be well. Don't mess with us.
If you, if you, if you resist or continue your internecine wars, we will have to sort things out. We could crush you if we really needed to. We don't intend to. We're here on a peace mission. That was part of what they said.
And then they also said, You know the those big boats, three giant boats, the 55 foot Gill boat and the two large wooden pirogues. They don't have any trade goods, I know you think boats bring trade goods as they have, but we don't have trade goods. Now. We do have some things we'd like to give you as a token of our friendship and as kind of a menu. You know? Like, almost like the Avon lady appearing at your house of things you can get if you cooperate with, you know. This will include kettles and needles and awls and hatchets and saws and things that you you can't produce from metal because you don't have any metallurgy. And we'll bring you cloth, and we'll bring you beads, and we'll bring you of ribbon. And and and um, mirrors and fish hooks, and um, curtain rings, and you know, pieces of metal that we think you're you're going to like. And this is going to. All these things together are going to make your life both more pleasurable and easier. And we have them and you don't, and now you can get them from other European providers, but we don't want you to. You must trade with us and us alone, because we will get you better prices and we're going to establish a viable trade network. It'll be coming any day.
Now just be patient, and if you work with us, we will revolutionize your lives in an important way. That was the message. What the Natives heard is another question, and we have some evidence about that from their time. Lewis and Clark's time in North Dakota, where other white people from the Northwest Company and the Hudson's Bay Company were actually embedded in the Mandan and Hidatsa villages. And saw Lewis and Clark come and go and observe them and wrote about them.
And so we have some record, indirectly, of native reaction to Lewis and Clark through the eyes of these other traders. They weren't always objective, and they had sort of an anti-American attitude to a certain degree. But nevertheless, we have that evidence, and Lewis and Clark recorded some evidence in the journals from the Native peoples themselves. For example, Out amongst the Shoshone in August of 1805, a young man said to Lewis After hearing all this, how's this supposed to work? You know, we choose our leaders by their prowess in warfare, you know, horse stealing and skirmishing and raids.
If we lived in peace, as you're insisting that we do, that will undercut the very fabric of our leadership system. That's how we choose the chiefs and leaders of our society, and they said, And by the way, that's how we mate. You know that women are attracted to those who are great hunters, great horse dealers, great warriors, and so this would essentially upend the social structure of the shoshone. I don't think we can agree to that.
And even when they did agree, as they sometimes did or seem to. The fact is, the minute Lewis and Clark went around the corner, the Native people sort of returned to their ancient life ways. As you would expect they would. I mean, you know, why would we think that Lewis and Clark appear out of nowhere, unannounced and say they're the wave of the future? Not at all certain at that point. And kind of bully their way through and trying to reset the social dynamics and then say we'll be back, but did not come back. Why would we think that Native peoples would say, Oh, I guess they're a superior civilization, I guess we'll hearken to their suggestions? It's absurd.
And I think this is where we are in the Lewis and Clark world, you know, I began as a Lewis and Clark scholar and a Jefferson scholar. I still love Lewis and Clark. I'm the editor of. We proceeded on which you should subscribe to just go to the website.
It's headquartered the Lewis and Clark Trail Heritage Foundation is headquartered in Great Falls. And Join you get the four issues of We Proceeded on the quarterly Scholarly Journal, which I have the joy of editing. You get those per year and other perks, so you should do that. It's really fun.
I just wrapped up the November issue of We Proceeded on. it'll be out in about 10 days and I'm now already working on the February issue. So that's something that you should do. But this was one of my first loves, of course. I grew up in North Dakota, which is on the Lewis and Clark Trail.
And I've spent a lot of time traveling the trail, I've flown over it in a F-16 in South Dakota. I've been on cruise ships in the Lower Columbia, I've canoed in Montana and elsewhere, I've been on power boats on Lake Sakakawea and Lake Oahe.
I have driven along it in my automobile, I've driven along it in an RV for a documentary film. I've spent an enormous amount of time on the trail and will be doing it all over again and systematically. From Monticello all the way to Astoria, and back again for listening to America. But not in the first round. The first round will be the Travels with Charlie Trip, beginning in 2024. But I certainly intend to do absolutely every piece of the Lewis and Clark trail and take thousands and thousands of photographs. And meet with all the scholars and lovers of the story and buffs along the way, and interview people too.
But this is the story that really matters to me, and I think that where we are with it is that. The old paradigm of Lewis and Clark explaining the benevolence of the American system to Native peoples, and then wondering why the Native peoples were resisting, that has to be over now. We now know that Native people had their own systems and their own sovereignty. That they didn't just cheerfully accept the superiority of the Anglo-Americans, and that to expect that somehow they were being ungenerous or mulish, or recalcitrant is an insane thing to say. Just as we would resist if people from Jupiter suddenly came in and took over the United States and said, Yeah, we have a superior system. You'll want to get on board right away. It's completely different from your own and upends everything you understand, but I promise you you'll like it.
There's no chance in the world that we would say, great, can't wait. So I think what we're seeing now is that the cultural revolution is finally catching up with Lewis and Clark. And the beginning came long ago, in 1984, with James Ronda's pioneering book, Lewis and Clark among the Indians. It needs to be updated because an enormous amount has been learned since he wrote that revolutionary book, but it paves the way for everything that follows.
David DeCandre, who's a frequent guest on this program, has written the most important subsequent book on Lewis and Clark amongst natives. It's his book River of Doubt Lewis and Clark on the Columbia, which I had the glory of editing for the Dakota Institute Press. I bring up most of these topics in my own work, both in the essays that I write for. We proceeded on every quarter. I write what I call an essayette, a couple of thousand words for every one of the four annual issues. And I write sidebars and other things to explain the doctrine of discovery and the spelling of the name of Sacagawea, and so on.
But I also have my book, The Character of Meriwether Lewis, Explorer in the Wilderness, which takes on many of these subjects also. So I invite you to take a look at that. We only gave a couple of minutes to that today because we had 10 things to talk about, including this extraordinary exchange between Jefferson and James Monroe. When Jefferson was persuading, Lindsay says, manipulating Monroe into going to France to help consummate the purchase of New Orleans. Or even more, if possible. So I'm recording this podcast introduction a few days a week before Thanksgiving, which is my favorite holiday. By the time you hear this, that holiday will be over.
But I want to say how much. I feel gratitude for you for being faithful listeners to this program, and for your contributions to Listening to America. Your questions, your suggestions, your challenges. At times, all that is really central to my own happiness. And when I give thanks, especially this year, I give thanks to you for making possible what I get to do as a labor of love. You know, as we have always said, I take no emolument from this except joy, except psychic joy, psychic pay. Which is every bit as important as Lucre, in fact, for me, much more important in the long run.
So thank you and everyone that I meet, says. The coming of Lindsay Czerwinski was a great thing for First the Jefferson Hour, and now for Listening to America. She seems to love it, she's got her own fan base, you probably see her on major media.
She's a rising star, she's going to rise much more. We'll keep her close to us as long as we can. But I don't predict, pretend that she will always be available because her career is going to be a very big one, I think. But for the moment, we are fortunate to have her. And David DeCandre, of course. And Joe Ellis, who hasn't been on for a while because he's been moving, but we'll get him back in the new year and much more.
And so next year is going to be a fascinating year. And at some point in June or May, you're going to hear me say hello everyone and welcome to listening to America. This is Clay Jenkinson. I am at Big Bone Lick Kentucky today, I'm in my airstream and I'm talking with, or I'll say hello everyone and welcome to listening to America.
I'm Clay Jenkinson. I am at Sag Harbor, at the edge of the Long Island, where Steinbeck and his wife, his third wife, Elaine, had a home. Or Hello everyone and welcome to Listening to America. I'm at Devil's Tower, which was the first of the national monuments, first ever, and designated by one of my historical interests, Theodore Roosevelt. So you're going to hear from the airstream as if live.
I mean, there'll be taped, of course, but as if live listening to America podcasts in the field. And I'll describe what I'm seeing and the people I'm talking to, and what I'm learning and what I'm reading. I think it's going to be absolutely fascinating, but we'll still have Lindsay once, and often twice a month. The candry will be more important under this structure because we'll be in places where he has a strong interest too, particularly in the American West. There'll be lots of talk of Steinbeck and my dear friend Russ Eagle will be a part of that, so great things are coming.
I'm very excited. I know there have been some growing pains on audio technical quality in a couple of instances. And, you know, we don't yet have a permanent guest host. I need that. I want it to be a woman who has Lindsay's spunk, but who wants to host, you know, Lindsay's a star.
We don't want her to have to host the program, but I want somebody who can be playful and irreverent and really enjoy engaging in these conversations. And that person can live anywhere, of course, and it has to have a radio voice of some sort. You know, it doesn't have to be hello. Welcome to the Thomas Jefferson hour, it doesn't have to be like that.
So anyway, I can't wait for Thanksgiving, by far my favorite holiday. I'm going to try a couple of new things this year, including a new recipe for cream of mushroom soup that I learned from friends in Thompson, North Dakota, a week or two ago. Let's go to the program. 10 Things about the Louisiana Purchase.
One of my favorite subjects in the world and a really spirited conversation with Dr. Lindsay Trevinsky. Thank you everyone.
Hello everyone and welcome to listening to America today. 10 things about the Louisiana Purchase. My friend Dr. Lindsay Trevinsky is at the other end of the country.
We're speaking by way of Zoom technology. And today, 10 things about the Louisiana. Purchase, which doubled the size of the United States in 18 three, consummated in Paris on April 30th, 18 three and ratified not unanimously by the United States Senate. On October 20th, 1803, Mr. Jefferson purchased 575 million acres and 828,000 square miles from Napoleon Bonaparte, thus effectively doubling the size of the United States. Welcome Lindsay.
Well, thank you for having me. I'm looking forward to this conversation very much.
I hope Jefferson comes out unscathed. So 10 things I'll just quickly go over them. Previous attempts to obtain New Orleans, the French context, particularly with respect to Haiti. The purchase offer and Napoleon's famous counteroffer, the role of the American Minister to France, Robert Livingston. Thomas Jefferson's constitutional anxieties about whether the purchase was actually constitutional. Those were yours mine. Frederick Jackson Turner's view in his famous Frontier essay, The Closing of the Frontier, 1893, about the inflection point that the Louisiana purchase represents pressure from the American West for Jefferson and the Jefferson administration to do something about the closing or potential closing of the Mississippi River.
A really interesting letter that Jefferson wrote to his protege Monroe, not only persuading him to go to France, but sort of forcing him to take on that role. Then, extremely interesting and important. Saddening the implications for slavery. Because this was a moment when the United States could have gone in one of two directions on the expansion of slavery into the West. And, finally, exploration of the Louisiana purchase. So, Lindsay, let's pick it up at previous attempts. So, at the end of the Revolutionary War, the settlement in Paris in 1783 gave the United States everything up into the east bank of the Mississippi River. A gigantic territory that wouldn't be filled for 60 or 70 years at least. And suddenly, in 183, we doubled it.
Why?
Well, I think the intention was not initially to double it, although there was constant pressure for more land and a desire for more space. And a real, I think, conviction among a lot of American people that you needed to always have more land as a safety valve. There was this belief that one of the things that had been a problem in Great Britain is you only had so much territory. And so it really led to an intense social hierarchy of classes. As long as we had a safety valve of more land, we wouldn't ever have that sort of stratification. But the real push behind this moment was, as you said in one of the items, the Mississippi River. Because for anyone, basically, in the western half of states like Pennsylvania, Virginia, Kentucky, New York, blah, blah, blah. It was much cheaper to get your goods west and have them go down the river for sale in New Orleans. Or to go to other ports than to try and track them east.
And so, as long as the United States did not have control over the Mississippi River and, critically, the Port of New Orleans. Our ability to expand economically, geographically, uh, financially, was going to be limited by.
That control, yes, a couple of things there. First of all, you mentioned the need for more land, always the desire for more land. But also sort of as a corollary to that. The United States did not want to be hemmed in by Spain or France, or Britain or Russia. That Jefferson more than any other. But there he wasn't alone. Wanted this to be an American continent and was not going to be willing to have the French or the Spanish standing in the way of westward expansion from the West.
So that was a significant part of it. So Jefferson, a visionary with a very strong interest in the West, was not going to let us be hemmed in by these foreign powers.
That's right. And there had been a number of past moments when there were real fears about European empires circulating on the periphery. And trying to maybe pick off some states, causing some anxieties between the states. So there was always kind of a fear that Kentucky's emotional bonds to the nation were initially quite weak. And maybe they would decide that they would rather be a part of a European empire, but also there was a hierarchy of fear within the empires, so everyone kind of knew that Spain was on its last legs and was not going to be as much of a threat. Whereas France and Great Britain were still a real threat and were seen as a problematic neighbor to have in the European neighbor, or, excuse me, in the imperial neighborhood.
Jefferson understood that with the retrocession of the Louisiana territory from Spain, an impotent and declining power to France, that something had to be done. And this takes me to the second of my points pressure from the West. Jefferson had a really uncanny ability to read situations. He was an extraordinary diplomat and he had an incredible sensitivity to the mood of the country. And he knew that the Western states were frustrated that they wanted the Mississippi kept open.
They felt that the federalists had not done a good enough job in doing that. And that John Jay had actually sold the West out in one of his negotiations in Spain. And they felt strongly that if Jefferson or the Jefferson administration couldn't do something to get this problem solved, they might attach themselves elsewhere. Because commerce mattered to them at least as much as their American patriotism, right?
It did, and I think, you know this. This backstory is important because it demonstrates the ongoing efforts to try and solve this problem. So initially, as you said, Jay signed a treaty during the Confederation period with Spain to try and kind of figure out relations. And he did sell out the Mississippi interest, especially in New Orleans. In 1795, Thomas Pinckney, who was from South Carolina, had signed a new treaty with Spain. And that had given Americans the right of what's called a deposit.
So the right to trade on the Mississippi and the right to deposit their goods in New Orleans. However, Spain kind of was ambivalent about enforcing that treaty and would sometimes close things here and there. But as Spain decided to retrocede New Orleans and the Mississippi to France, that agreement would no longer be in place. So what was seen as a solution to this problem was no longer acceptable, even though France and the United States were on decent-ish terms. At this point, there was a sense that they would be a much more powerful threat to the right of access to those things.
Agreed, and I think that Jefferson felt that he had to do something. In other words, if there hadn't been the crisis in the West, if there hadn't been the retrocession. If the commanders down in New Orleans hadn't been opening and shutting the river, he probably would not have acted. After all, he was a believer in a republic, and Montesquieu said A republic needs to be relatively small in size. Jefferson, I think, knew in the long run we would take the continent, but we didn't need to be in any hurry about it.
But what was going on in New Orleans caused a crisis in the West and he had to act. Or who knows what would have happened, there might've been border wars. And so at that point, he decided to stir himself into action, which he, you know, Jefferson was more more wanting to wait things out than to act in most situations. So then he contacted James Monroe, his his second protege after Madison, and said, I want you to go on a special mission that you and you alone can can be responsible for to Paris to help solve this problem.
But when he sent Monroe to Paris Lindsay, he wasn't saying, Go buy the Louisiana territory.
That's right, and we should say, cause I don't think we've mentioned this at this point. France is under the control of Emperor Napoleon. So initially, the offer, which is one of my items, uh, was to go request to buy New Orleans, the Port of New Orleans and the Floridas.
What is now? One state was two states at the time, sort of Western Florida and Eastern Florida. And it made sense that the United States would want these. A because it would can help connect up to New Orleans. But also, they were beneath all of the southern states, and they were a place where a lot of self-emancipated, enslaved individuals ran away to. So it was, it was for lots of reasons. This territory was wanted and they offered to buy those two states and the Port of New Orleans for $10 million. And that was the offer that Robert Livingston was authorized to make to Napoleon. Now the story gets a little bit complicated from there, because, as you said, Jefferson also sent Monroe.
Uh, and by the time Monroe arrived, Livingston had received a counter offer from Napoleon, and would you like to say what the counter offer was?
Well, so Napoleon, eager to prosecute his wars in Europe and bankrupt, and having had a debacle in Haiti, decided to divest himself of the whole thing and just get as much cash as he could. Because he reckoned that in the World War that he thought was coming, Britain was going to take control of New Orleans anyway. So why not sell it to the Yankees and see what happens? But he wanted to move on and he needed cash, so he offers to sell the whole shooting match, as we say. It turned out for about $15.3 million. But I just want to go back for a moment.
Jefferson was more interested himself in the Florida, he knew that he had to do something about New Orleans and the River, but he himself lusted for. The Florida's never got over it, and the Florida's, as you say, wasn't. The Florida's, as you say, weren't just the current state of Florida, but Florida, plus the Gulf Coast, all the way to Texas. And that mattered to him because that would give us a sole control of the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. And so Jefferson really wanted that, and he was willing to take New Orleans to solve the crisis, but he really wanted both.
We didn't get the Florida's in the treaty.
Correct, that came later. That was another purchase on which I believe was negotiated by John Quincy Adams. One subject we sort of skated by, but I think we need to return to, was the context in Haiti with Napoleon. And this is really important because this is why we can never look at American history in a vacuum, and it always exists in an international context.
And there are other factors that are shaping our actions and we're shaping theirs. So, in 1793, in the middle of the French Revolution, the French Assembly had declared an end to slavery. And one of the French colonies was Saint-Domingue, which is now known as Haiti. And it was a very wealthy sugar colony, and it was predominantly worked by enslaved individuals, but it was a very complex, multiracial hierarchy that's very different than what we think of in the South.
So just important for that context, slavery had been abolished in 1801, the Haitian Revolution broke out, so this is right at the beginning of Jefferson's administration, the Haitian revolution breaks out. And Napoleon, by this point, has signed a temporary peace treaty with Britain. And decides that he is going to send an enormous French fleet to reassert French authority. Within two months of the fleet's arrival, 15,000 French soldiers had died from yellow fever alone.
And that was right when Robert Livingston came and said, How would you like to sell us New Orleans and the Floridas? Napoleon says. I will do you one better. And how about half of the country?
Sends his troops, they go to Saint-Domingue, they're decimated. Suddenly, he's losing men and money, and there's no solution to this problem. You know, Haiti today is one of the bleakest problem spots in the Western hemisphere, maybe in the world. How much of that is owing to these acts of European racist colonialism?
An enormous amount of its current situation. Because as the French finally left, the Haitian people were forced to pay the French basically reparations for declaring their own independence. And that took a very long time to pay off. Basically saddled this new country with an enormous amount of debt after it was really starting Haiti as an independent nation, way behind the starting line. And that's a very difficult burden to try and build a new history based on.
And it's a tragedy that continues, and it tells you about the legacies of colonialism in the worst possible way. We're going to take a short break. I'm talking with Dr. Lindsay Chervinsky.
10 things about the Louisiana Purchase. When we come back, I want to ask you about the American response to the Haitian revolution. This is a special edition of Listening to America. We'll be back in just a moment.
Welcome back to this special edition of Listening to America. Lindsay Chervinsky. We are talking about 10 things per the Louisiana purchase. And when we went to break, we were talking about the Haitian revolution, Toussaint louverture, the Black Napoleon, as he was sometimes called, and the results of that. And I think it's fair to say that the slave holding class in the United States, including one, Thomas Jefferson, freaked out when this revolution began.
Because it was the first time in the history of the United States that it meant that if there's a Black insurgency, a Black revolution in Haiti. This could bleed over into Georgia, the Carolinas, Kentucky. These slaveholders lived in constant, paranoid fear that there would be a race war in the United States. And whenever there was a rebellion, like Gabriel's rebellion or any others, they went into a kind of a militaristic siege mentality. And one of the more disappointing moments in anyone's characterization of Jefferson is his response to this revolution.
Yeah, the American response is really interesting and quite multifaceted. So there were a lot of people from the north, especially if they were involved in the merchant class. That saw it as a real opportunity. It was another Caribbean nation to potentially trade with, to provide food and supplies, and so that was a real opening. But a lot of those people were were federalists.
So they saw the financial opportunity, but they feared the radicalism that might come in from the Haitian revolution. So when the revolution initially broke out, a lot of French emigres came from France and from Saint-Domingue to the United States. And an interesting element of that was they often brought their enslaved people with them. So when we talk about this complex racial dynamic, it's really quite messy. And so the federalists were fearing that they were going to bring this anarchy, and they were going to destroy the government and the Republicans. People like Thomas Jefferson feared that they were going to start a racial uprising, so everyone feared them. But just for lots of different reasons.
And you're right that the racial concerns were were real. Because there was an understanding that no matter how much the what they called the slavocracy at the time cracked down on information, enslaved people had conversations, they had networks, this information spread, and there was really nothing that they could do about it.
You know, it puts Jefferson in a very, very awkward light. We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, he's the, he's the philosopher of self-determination. Suddenly, the majority population in Haiti wants to determine its own destiny. And Jefferson gives Napoleon the sort of tacit nod to go ahead and put it down as ruthlessly as necessary.
It's true, it's. It's one of the more awkward moments. And I would also say it's one of the sadder diplomatic complications. Because initially, under the Adams administration, Timothy pickering for all of his flaws, and I go into many in the book that I'm finalizing. He was really committed to trying to work with the new Haitian nation, and, uh, established diplomatic ties and established trade ties, and Adams was very supportive.
And when Jefferson came into office, he cut off that connection.
And Adams was moderately willing to be supportive of the revolution, which is another great moment for John Adams. That he had a consistent love of of liberty, and he was able to see beyond race, not entirely, but largely.
Yeah, because that would be incorrect. But he certainly was able to see beyond race when thinking about, and really, he was thinking about what was good for the United States. As he recognized that this was another nation to engage with, and it was willing to do so, whether or not they were white, black or otherwise.
10 things about the Louisiana Purchase. Lindsay, I'm going to give you a chance to do a daily double. You can beat up on Jefferson and James Monroe in the same answer. So by the time Monroe got there, Livingston had essentially consummated the thing he was a little uncertain of what to do.
He was deaf, he didn't want to go outside of his portfolio, but really, the offer had been made and he knew that it was a great thing. And suddenly in comes Monroe, the president's pal, full of his own majesty and his authority. And he kind of shoves Livingston out of the way and for the rest of his life, takes enormous credit for this thing.
When, really, it was Napoleon first, Livingston second, Monroe third.
Yeah, I am. I find this story so entertaining because I guess for all of the knocks that I have given Monroe in our conversations, and there are many. He was a great salesman at this moment, he knew how to sell it. So, one of Livingston's concerns at the time, the United States was quite meticulous with its budget, and it did not exceed its budget. And it did not, you know, Willy Nilly, get into debt. So it did have debt, and it did owe money to many European nations, especially the Dutch, but it was very careful about taking on that debt.
And so to agree to $5 million more dollars, which was at the time an astronomical sum, half the budget of the U.S. per annum. Yes, so a huge, huge endeavor without any sort of approval from the President. And, of course, keep in mind, he can't pick up a phone, so he's having to wait.
He would have had to wait probably eight weeks at the very, very best for a reply. But he also knows that he can't wait eight weeks to accept this deal, because it kind of comes with an expiration date, so he agrees to the deal. Monroe comes, he swoops in. Monroe is very beloved by the French, and he loves the French. Because he had previously been a minister to the United States and had left, well, sort of in disgrace. He had been recalled by Washington for being too pro-French as the American minister presiding with France over the United States.
Yes, exactly. And so he comes and he's all excited to be there, and they're excited to have him. And he writes back to Jefferson Amazing news. Look, what I have accomplished. Kind of forgetting to mention, Oh, right.
Livingston was there first and comes back and says, Look, what I have accomplished and aren't I amazing, and the United States can thank me. And poor Robert Livingston never really gets his due.
Did he grumble? Did Livingston write about this or complain about this?
You would know better than I. I think he certainly privately complained about it.
He made it known that this had been basically consummated.
Yeah, but I don't know that he necessarily did, he write. Like, a, you know? Monroe was famous for his vindications.
Yeah, Monroe wrote that two volume vindication after George Washington recalled it.
500 pages.
That's completely killing off any future relationship with George Washington, but that's another story. What about the famous myth that Napoleon was taking a bath? And a minister came in and he said, I and he splashed the water and said, I give up and take it anything to anything to this.
I don't know you would know better than me. I mean, it sounds like a story that was nicely made up for for cinematic purposes, even though it was before television.
All right, so maybe the bathtub thing occurred, and maybe it didn't. It's an awfully good story. So I want to go to Monroe, Jefferson wrote a letter to Monroe on January 13th, 1803.
And I want to read a little piece of it too, he said, telling him he had to do this because Monroe had retired from government. He'd been kind of burned out in several ways and a little bit bitter. He now needed to make some money as a private attorney, and he did not want to undertake a mission like this.
And Jefferson writes to him a couple of letters, and on the 13th of January, he says All eyes, all hopes are now fixed on you. And were you to decline, the chagrin would be universal and would shake under your feet the high ground on which you stand with the public. Indeed, I know nothing which would produce such a shock, for on the event of this mission depends the future destinies of this republic.
If we cannot buy, purchase of the country, and sure to ourselves, of course. The perpetual peace and friendship with all nations, and as war, cannot be distant. It behooves us immediately to be preparing for that course. Et cetera, et cetera. Monroe didn't want to do this. But how do you say no to Thomas Jefferson on this one? But here's the funny thing about it. Well, first comment, Do you have a comment?
Well, I just. There's no one who can do manipulation like Jefferson can do manipulation. He's the most manipulative person that has maybe ever existed. Because he knew exactly which buttons to push, he knew exactly what strings to pull.
He did it to Washington, sometimes he did it to his daughters, He did it to Monroe, I know he did it to Madison. I mean, it's just he was so good at maneuvering people into doing what he wanted them to do.
He goes on on this letter of January 13th and says, I am sensible. After the measures you have taken for getting into a different line of business, you know, going to get some work in law that it will be a great sacrifice on your part. Um, and presents from the season and other circumstances, serious difficulties. Some men are born for the public, some men are fitted for the service of the human race on a broad scale, all right.
So Monroe gets it, he goes. But here's what's so interesting. Lindsay Uh, when Jefferson was moping after the Tarleton attack at Monticello in 1781 and retiring and saying he was done forever. And only the all healing grave would ever overcome the pain that he had received from the American public. And so I'm pouting, pouting in a big, big way. Monroe wrote him a letter and said, Oh, come on, you're Jefferson.
You're important, this is just an event that they'll forgive you. They've already apologized to you, you know, get over it, we need you.
Jefferson wrote back to him and said, No. The law does not warrant the assumption of such power by the state over its members, or if it does, where is that law? Nor yet does reason for? Though? I admit that this does subject every individual, if called on, to an equal tour of political looting. Yet it can never go so far as to submit it to its whole existence. If we are made in some degree for others, yet in a greater, we are made for ourselves. It were contrary to feeling, and indeed ridiculous to suppose a man had less right in himself than one of his neighbors. Or all of them. Put together, this would be slavery and not liberty.
Whoa. So if he had received the letter from Monroe, he would have written this and said, I've done my service. Nobody can make me do it. I am not going to be enslaved to our republic. A very ill choice of word.
I would say, amazing, isn't it? I mean, that Jefferson had this strong sense, and I believe he meant it of a personal privacy and the sovereignty of the individual. But when it was in his interest as president, flip that switch in a second.
In that same letter to Monroe from 1781, Jefferson The famous sentence from Jefferson. I had been suspected and suspended in the eyes of the world without the least hint. Then or afterwards, made public, which might restrain them from supposing. I stood a rain for reasons of the heart and not mere weaknesses of the head. And I felt that those injuries, for such they have been since acknowledged, had inflicted a wound on my spirit, which will only be cured by the all healing grave. Whoa, that's, uh, you know, not even John Adams would whine in that way. That's a pretty strong, um, self pity.
Uh, yeah, he was pretty good at that.
So so, he, he forces Monroe to do it, Monroe goes, arrives basically too late. Uh, takes all the credit. To this day, if you read a high school textbook, it'll say, Uh, Louisiana purchased James. Monroe made the deal in France.
It will. And Monroe, Yeah, he really sold that one, so, like I said, he, he deserves all the credit for the marketing.
Interesting, All right, I want to go to the Amendment. So Jefferson didn't expect this, he was hoping for the for the Florida's in New Orleans. But when he saw what the treaty was and it came to him around the 4th of July 1803, he was worried.
He's a strict constructionist, at times, at least. He believed that we should never take a step beyond the boundaries of the Constitution. He had famously attacked Hamilton for being a broad constructionist on the National Bank Bill. Suddenly, he has a chance to double the size of the country for 3 cents per acre. But he does actually think it's probably unconstitutional, since the Constitution does not have an explicit right for the executive or the government to acquire territory.
So what does Jefferson do, my friend?
And also, the Constitution had a pretty well laid out plan for how to add states. So it was not just that the Constitution was silent about acquiring land, it was that there was already sort of an agreed upon method. Jefferson almost never convened a Cabinet meeting unless he knew exactly what the secretaries were already going to say. Because he believed that disagreement was unproductive, largely based on his experience in Washington's administration. So he drafted up a constitutional amendment that would have given him authority to do this in what he felt was a constitutional fashion.
And he shared it with his Cabinet secretaries, and most of them said, That's a really bad idea. Some, you know, gave more nuanced, Madison gave more nuanced feedback, kind of trying to, you know, fudge it. Robert Smith was the secretary of the Navy, and he was among the most opposed. Because he felt like he was going to be stirring up a wasness for no reason. Until Congress asked for it, until anyone made an objection.
Why would he introduce this problem until someone had actually seen it? And Jefferson tweaked the language and he fiddled with it, and he shared it with them again, and they all continued to express reservations. And so when he did finally convene a Cabinet meeting to talk about the Louisiana purchase, he then did not discuss the amendment. He discussed how to convene Congress early because they had to bring together Congress in order to ratify it. The treaty offer was going to expire on October 30th, and usually Congress didn't convene until November-ish.
So they had to bring Congress back together early, and then once they brought Congress back. Rumors were starting to circulate that Napoleon was having second thoughts. Madison was convinced that Napoleon wasn't actually having second thoughts. He was just saying he was having second thoughts to speed the process along, and maybe that was so.
And if that's the case, then Napoleon was playing that situation quite brilliantly. But Jefferson was not willing to take the risk that those rumors were correct. And so he did not introduce the Constitutional Amendment to Congress. And even though he continued to fiddle with it and tweak it, he put it in a drawer. Until and if Congress raised an objection, which they did not.
So the cabinet, if I can use kind of Lindsay-esque language, response was, Are you nuts? You know, you're doubling the size of the country. I wouldn't fiddle around with this and make any problems, either in the Senate or anywhere else. Let's just do it. Uh, history will vindicate you, which, of course, it has.
But I also admire Jefferson for this. He's a strict constructionist, you know. He made some flexibility with it at times, but on the whole, he meant it. Like the people are sovereign, they've come together.
In Philadelphia, they granted powers to a government, They enumerated what those powers were, they didn't really enumerate this one. Therefore, we need an amendment authorizing the purchase.
And he wrote a second one, or at least toyed with one. That would figure out how to incorporate the new territory by way of new states. So he's consistent in this, I like this. He's a principled constitutionalist and he worried, and he should have worried. And we should worry that once you spring, the doors open on the Constitution, so that almost anything goes. You're not going to be a republic very long. But I think the Cabinet was right and Jefferson was wrong, so he wins both ways, right?
In the end, he winds up being flexible, he listens to his most senior. Uh, aid, particularly. Madison. Gets the thing done, gets all the credit in history for it. Uh, more than Napoleon, who actually did it. And at the same time, uh, as a Jefferson scholar, I can point to, well, look, he had these qualms because he really meant strict construction. So, you know, Hamilton's view would have been a You'll be a pitiful nation if you don't have broad construction. Come on, don't hamstring yourself this way.
And he actually did suggest, as I believe, that we should have just sent troops and taken it. Forget Napoleon, just go get it.
So to answer your first part, yes. I actually think that Jefferson deserves a lot of credit in this scenario because he, he's right, that he. The way that he was interpreting the Constitution is probably the most accurate. The necessary and proper clause has been expanded to include a whole lot of things, and I think it probably should be expanded to include a whole lot of things. Because we can never foresee what challenges are coming down the road.
And so there does need to be a certain amount of flexibility there that will allow the government to respond to those threats. Um, but governing also requires a certain pragmatism, it requires a certain realism about the state of the world. And when push came to shove in the presidency, at least in this moment, Jefferson's pragmatism wins out. And I think that that is generally the sign of an astute leader. Hamilton is hilarious.
And this actually gets at one of my other ones on my list about the previous attempts to sort of take care of this problem. And there were many other discussed options, so there were previous sales that were discussed, there were many previous treaties which we touched on some of them.
My particular favorite occurs in 1799. When it's becoming clear that the new or the provisional army that was created to to grapple with the French threat is probably not going to be used. And Hamilton floats these ideas of marching the army south into Florida to, kind of through Virginia, which may or may not have been useful in the election. You know, going into Florida and then going into South America and helping South American revolutionaries, this idea is nuts. This is a totally insane plan.
It would have violated all sorts of civil liberties, but he thought it'd be a very good use for his new army. By this point, everyone pretty much understood that the United States was expanding and at some point was going to be a global power. This was a shared concept by both Americans and other imperial powers. And so it was only a matter of time before. There were going to be tensions between those lingering in the Floridas if they were not part of the United States and Americans. Americans wanted Cuba because it was one of the closest land masses to North America.
They wanted control of the Caribbean and the Gulf, as you mentioned, they wanted these trades, these trade routes, they were already growing into a pretty sizable economic power. And so there were a lot of good defensive reasons in terms of being able to control your own borders. Trade reasons in terms of having access to ports and to rivers, and to gulfs and national expansion regions. That were interesting to people who had visions of national expansion, like Hamilton, that you would want this territory, right?
But behind that rationale, there's Hamilton, who loves war and glory.
Yeah, he wanted military glory, too. I mean, he desperately wanted to be a military hero and felt that war was the only way to do it.
There's one last thing about this, you know? Jefferson said. He was not an imperialist, he wanted an empire for liberty such as the world had never previously seen. Strange concept for what's coming in the third section of this conversation. But he did say to Madison once No, I'm not, I'm not an imperialist.
At the bottom most tip of Cuba, we'll plant a cairn on which we'll print NE Plus Ultra thus far, and no farther, so Atlantic to Pacific North Pole, to the bottom of Cuba. That's not an imperialistic vision at all.
Um, yeah, not, not at all. Um, no, Jefferson was totally imperialist, he just was imperialist in a different way. He liked the idea of his vision of liberty expanding across the globe to white or mostly white nations, he liked the idea of an empire of science.
He liked the idea of natural exploration, he understood the very real, tangible benefits that would accrue to the United States for, through and for expansion. And so he wasn't dumb about those things he knew.
There's a certain nobility to his vision, I think, uh, if he really meant it. By spreading the flame of liberty across the planet and so on, of course, this would come at the expense of Indigenous peoples. We need to remember that always. And he certainly didn't have that vision in mind. For African-Americans. No, we need to take a break.
Lindsay, When we come back, I want to ask you about the Frederick Jackson Turner thesis. I'll set it up. This is a special edition of Listening to America. We will be back in just a moment.
Welcome back to Listening to America. 10 Things About the Louisiana Purchase Lindsay Before I start Elbridge Gary Gerrymander Why?
So Elbridge Gary was the first he was governor of Massachusetts, when what was considered to be sort of the first, really ridiculous. We call. Gerrymandering. Map redistricting occurred in Massachusetts, and it was the map of the districts in Massachusetts were created in. One looked like a salamander, um, and when? All across the state, in wonky places. And it was for the same reasons that we we redistricted Gerrymander today. I think when people first started calling it gerrymandering, they just pronounced his name wrong.
So, just so, we shouldn't say gerrymandering.
I mean, if we were to use it based on his name, then yes, it would be gerrymandering, but obviously gerrymandering is what we know. And I called it that for a long time, too, until I actually met a Gary descendant, it's like, Nope, it's Gary. I was like, all right, good to know.
Indeed, well, let's get back to it. So, um? The frontier was declared closed in 1890 by the U. S. Census Bureau. By which they meant that there was not a large chunk of free land still available in the West, there was still pockets, but essentially, we had eaten up the continent in one way or another.
And so the term frontier would no longer be used. And that led a young, up and coming scholar in Wisconsin named Frederick Jackson Turner, to write a famous essay. Which turned out to be one of the most famous essays in American history called The Significance of the Frontier in American History, which was delivered in 1893. In it, he said that the Louisiana purchase was the making moment of American history. But it also meant we could not be a republic, that now we had to be an empire. Jefferson doesn't really write about this, but early in his career, he, as you know, he and Madison were obsessed with the problem of the large republic.
They were, um, and I think he doesn't address this, but I think I would actually give different reasons why it made a republic difficult. And a lot of it actually gets at his language, um, in this essay, so. And one of the terms that has really shifted out of the historical discourse is frontier. And that's because if you think about what a frontier implies, it's one side is, um, are heathens, and it's not civilized, and they're barbarians.
And another side is is civilized society. So you have the forest and then you have the people, and of course, that's. We know that that's not what it was, because there were different civilizations, there were different types of cultures. Now, the term that is more I think is more accurate is borderlands. Because it implies that there are multiple different communities and societies and cultures and forms of law intersecting in this space.
And his terminology of frontier, I think, is a valuable one. Because it demonstrates that. By taking on this land, we were engaging in conflict and eventually in subordination of native nations. But also, and one of the items I know on your list is to talk about how, what it meant for the expansion of slavery and both things, slavery and our interactions with Native Americans were inherently imperial activities.
Yes, so I like your term. Borderlands. Some of these terms that we have been so used to in American history and historiography turn out to be loaded. So this term then ceases to be used by the by the Census Bureau. In 1890, Turner writes his famous thesis.
Um, interestingly enough, Theodore Roosevelt read it and wrote to Turner and said, You know, I couldn't agree more with you about this. But you didn't emphasize violence enough that these, these frontiersmen, these white frontiersmen, were violent, they were. They were not members of the rotary, you know? They were using their guns and chopping things down and and and killing natives and killing off the wolves, and and and clearing the forest. And that this was. America is the nation it is. And this is all good for Roosevelt. Because there was this errand in the wilderness, and that errand required a certain kind of strength of character. It wasn't for the faint of heart.
You know, Edgar Allen Poe is not a frontiersman, he's a poet. Daniel Boone is a frontiersman, Davy Crockett is a frontiersman, Theodore Roosevelt is a late frontiersman.
And and Roosevelt felt that this, this American complacency about violence, or commitment to violence, was actually what made us the great people that we are. So that's that's on Roosevelt.
Yeah, well, and I think a lot of that can actually be not to, like, get into Freudian psychology. But um. Roosevelt had a lot of insecurities about the fact that his father did not fight in the Civil War. And he felt that the Civil War was one of the moments. And I agree with him, that was the making of the United States a pivotal moment in which you defined yourself by your participation. And so I think he had a great deal of shame about the fact that. Even though he adored his father and really looked up to his father and shared a lot of interests with his father, he felt a lot of shame about that and he felt that it was sort of a duty and an obligation for man to seek out that sort of violence as a way to make yourself as a person. And so I think that did definitely shape his view of the role of violence in the West.
Again, and again, and again, Jefferson said. You know, slavery's wrong. I abhor it, it's an abomination. Uh, it's not compatible with our values. Um, I'll do anything I can to, um, to end it within limits.
You know, that's practicable, saying nobody feels more fervently than I do. When the moment comes, I'll be ready. So he buys the Louisiana territory. And as you said, and I want you to explain this, the race taxonomies, if I can use that term in New Orleans and in the Floridas, were not as rigid. White v black, slave v free, et cetera. Uh, as they were in Virginia or South Carolina, that there was more fluidity, there were, there were. There were a whole range of different designations and rights and privileges and constrictions, depending on whether you were Creole or Black, African, and so on.
And so there was, it was kind of the beginning of what was a more generous view of race. I would say in Louisiana territory in the south. But when we bought Louisiana, Jefferson had to make a decision, which is, how shall we govern it?
Yes, so part of the reason it is it is more complex is because it was not under American law. And American law at the time had been crafted over many centuries to reflect a very strict, race-based slavery. So you inherited the status of your mother, and there were increasing designations about what it meant to be black as opposed to white. Those calculations continue to shift over time, but nonetheless, they were starting to be reflected in the legal code. And rights to own property and to engage in business, and to have education, et cetera, et cetera were very limited for women, and were even more limited for most people of color in the United States.
In New Orleans, because it was very much a Creole, society had been Spanish and French, and people from the United States, and people from the Caribbean, and people from South America. There was, it was much more of a blend. And so you saw a lot of women business owners, you saw a lot of Black business owners, you saw a lot of Black business owners that actually owned other slaves that were Black. And so it was just a much more complex society that I don't in any way wish to say that slavery was less, but that there was room for advancement in a way that was not possible in a lot of cases in the United States. Because you could go on to have a business and have some form of economic success, even if you were a person of color.
And that was true also in the Floridas, where you had these communities that were formed in what we would think of as very inhospitable environments. That had mixed between Native Americans and self-emancipated, enslaved individuals and people that had come to colonize. And so you had just a very interesting mix of communities, and, to your point, when, when Jefferson took over, when they, when they got the Louisiana purchase. One of the questions is, is American law going to be enforced on these places? And the answer is somewhat more complex than we might think. Louisiana, at least on the state level, in terms of its state law, is technically Napoleonic code, where that does not conflict with federal law.
So it is a. If you, for example, want to become a lawyer in Louisiana and you take the bar exam, your bar exam is going to look very, very different than the New York bar exam. So there were it was a very complex question. And then I think we'll also get into what it meant for the expansion of slavery westward, because the purchase did have enormous implications for that as well.
So I guess my question is, could it have been otherwise? I mean, could, could the Jefferson administration have looked at the situation, that sort of the social demographic, legal situation in New Orleans and its environs? And said? I don't think they would have said this is a path forward for us, but they could have said we're going to leave this alone. We're going to leave this alone because it exists. It's stable. But they didn't, they reimposed a much more rigid.
Black is black, white is white, there aren't any variations. Um, they. They passed essentially what we would call black codes, uh, that retrofitted the populations there. I know these are what if questions, but could it have been otherwise?
Well, I think it certainly could have been, I don't know that it could have stayed exactly as it was. It certainly could have been something other than it turned out to be. But, you know, I think of places like Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, which passed emancipation laws, whether they be gradual or right away. And so you saw what became the underground railroad, and you saw this path of people that were fleeing slavery. North, usually up to Canada, because that was really where they could be truly free, because national law did not extend to Canada.
But Jefferson, if he had really wanted to. We will not allow slavery to expand any further into the West or Southwest than it already exists. You know? He had said this on a number of occasions previously in his life as wishful thinking. Would it have even been possible to say there can be no enslavement in the Louisiana territory?
I don't think so, so I don't. We should be fair to Jefferson that I don't think that. He knew that purchasing the Louisiana territories would have caused the expansion of slavery in the way that it did. Or at least, it was not his intention, or not his expectation, or not a motivating factor for the purchase. Maybe that's the very baseline I think the problem was. And the reason, he said that about expanding slavery West was because there was a real sense that slavery was dying out. That under the existing economic system, it didn't really make sense financially at this point. That cotton gin had not yet been invented, and so the expansion and explosion of the cotton empire had not occurred.
And so it didn't really make sense to try and increase slavery because it wasn't financially beneficial for the people. Certainly not the people enslaved, but for the people who were owning these plantations. And once you had the expansion of land, then all of a sudden there were all of these new places where you could sell off your quote unquote, extra enslaved people. And it became a financially viable enterprise again. And so I think that not only were the there the financial incentives to expand slavery. The Constitution was interpreted in such a way that would prohibit the government from prohibiting the expansion of slavery. There was, there was no power that was given to the federal government to make that kind of economic firm line. And so, even if Jefferson had wanted to, I don't think that he would have been able to. Because I think Congress would have pushed back, and I think the Supreme Court would have pushed back.
The South would have held up, held it up, just as they did at the Constitutional Convention and throughout American history. Nevertheless, when you see Jefferson's statements about this through a lifetime, and I think he meant them. Um, that. This is an abomination and we certainly shouldn't perpetuate it. And then you see that on this pivotal moment, he doesn't appear to have wrestled with this very long. And just sort of, okay, here we go. We'll just we'll incorporate it into the existing legal system of the U.S.
And we will, in sense, constrict the social order of Louisiana. That must've had an enormous influence on people living there. I would think it must've been a source of enormous frustration. Uh, but it is what it is. It wasn't until Lincoln, uh, where a president said firmly No further.
I'll, I'll, I'll, I'll die on this hill if I need to. And we know what came of that, right? All right, so I want to go to one last little question here.
First of all, just for those who might not know, uh, here's what the Louisiana purchase was. State of Louisiana, part of Texas, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Missouri, Iowa, Nebraska, South Dakota, part of Minnesota, North Dakota, part of Montana and part of Wyoming, and part of Colorado. I mean, a gigantic, really. The Great Plains is what we're talking about, and and parts of the Lower Midwest. But it would be impossible, as a historian, I think, to exaggerate the impact of this, uh, extraordinary moment in 1803..
It's almost impossible to come up with a counterfactual for what the United States would have been had they not purchased Louisiana territory. And that, I think, is a huge piece of evidence for how instrumental it was in shaping the future of the nation. That it's almost impossible for me to imagine what the nation would have been without it.
Yes, to think that the permanent Western border might've been the Mississippi River. That means somebody else is out there and it wasn't going to be Native Peoples. I think. The European colonial enterprise was such that there was no chance that there would be what George Catlin once suggested in the 1830s some sort of giant Native people's park.
No, I think we probably would be looking at something else, we've talked about the balkanization effect of of Europe. I think we probably would look at some sort of series of confederacies in North America. But that would mean that the history of the United States would be quite different. Because we have benefited from having only two neighbors that are generally very peaceful to us and two oceans. And that has been a gift that our nation continues to reap again and again.
We've been very fortunate in our neighbors, we really have the continent to ourselves.
Yeah, we do, and so few nations can say that, so it's just a completely changed. You can see, we're both kind of like grappling with words to accurately describe the magnitude of this moment. And I'm at least I'm coming, I'm coming up short of where I would like to be.
Incalculably large. And then so, our last topic for today, and by the way, we got through it. Um, all 10 is that? Jefferson was also a man of the enlightenment, a man of science, of the deep interest in geography, and, uh, the nature of the world. And he sent a number of expeditions into the Louisiana territory. Not just Lewis and Clark, but, of course, most famously, his protege, Lewis, Uh, Zebulon. Pike up the Mississippi in 1805 and to the Arkansas and Canadian Rivers in 1806, where he got himself arrested by the Spanish Hunter. And Dunbar on the Ouachita River, Freeman and Douglas on the On the Red River. So, Jefferson said, it's a canvas and we're going to send out these people and they're going to bring back. We'll start to fill in the canvas with the major arteries and with an inventory of the continent, and so on.
And so, you know, he didn't just buy it and say we'll see what happens here. He then wanted to find out what he had purchased. Primarily, I think, for the enlightenment, but also for geopolitical purposes. You know, the English way of establishing the doctrine of discovery is to be there and to build something. And that's exactly what happened at Fort Mandan and Fort Clatsop. But I think we have to give Jefferson high marks here.
This is one of the great moments in American history when he sent his protege and gave him a very broad agenda. To take down Native American vocabularies, to to speak of peace and prosperity, to try to bring natives into the American trade orbit. To look at the lands, to see if they were habitable by by American settlers, to see if the rivers interlocked. And maybe we could find a northwest passage across the continent to bring back data on new plants and new animals, and so on. This was one of the great moments of the enlightenment. And I don't know that John Adams would have done it, I don't know that John Quincy Adams would have done it. Although it should be said that John Quincy Adams voted yes on the Louisiana Purchase treaty.
Most of the federalists behaved the way our parties behave today. They were against it because it was Jefferson. Um, they also knew that almost every Western state would be more Jeffersonian than Federalist, but almost all the federalists decried the Louisiana purchase. But John Quincy Adams said, Are you kidding?
No, no, we have to do this.
Oh my gosh, I have so many things. Um, yes. So the federalists absolutely opposed it. I think some it was just blatant political reasons wanted to harm Jefferson, no doubt about it.
Especially people like Timothy Pickering. I'm going to have a lot of shots against Timothy Pickering in the next year, he's a very easy target. But yeah, I mean, just vile. Some federalists, actually, I think, genuinely had concerns about the constitutional issues that we discussed. And some had concerns about what it would do in terms of the nation's priorities. So they worried about having to funnel all of the funds to Defense of the West, because that had happened a fair amount. Because American settlers had trouble keeping their hands to themselves.
And so there were, I think, genuine concerns, but I do agree with you that it was mostly political. And for this vote, John Quincy Adams was kicked out of the Federalist Party and was not elected again because he supported Jefferson. I think that John Quincy Adams might have actually done, I don't know if he would have done something exactly the same. But he loved touring different regions, he loved to see the science. I think we've talked about all the different tree samples that he planted at the White House when he was there.
So he had a real appreciation for nature and the flora and the fauna. And in true John Quincy Adams fashion would quiz himself on the names to make sure he understood all of the Latin classifications of the different things. Because one can never just have a walk in the woods, it has to be a lesson and test for one's mind. You know, what I think is really interesting is there's two types of, you know, like naturalists. There's the Thomas Jefferson Send your Protege, and there's the Theodore Roosevelt. You have to go do it and kill things yourself.
So, as we've discussed, Jefferson liked to stay home at Monticello. But I agree with you that he did really send Lewis and Clark with extraordinarily enlightened instructions in terms of trying to cultivate good relationships. This was not a, you know, burn and pillage mission, by any stretch.
It was an imperial spear, the tip of the spear, of course, but relatively benign. As these things go, we're out of time, unfortunately. I want to just say this much more. The exact boundaries of the Louisiana territory were uncertain in the in what's now Texas, and also in the Northwest and Minnesota, and so on. And it was J.Q. Adams, as the very gifted secretary of state, who squared things off on the northern border at the 49th parallel. And he actually corrected Jefferson, who was willing to just cut the deal without knowing where the border should be. And Adam said, No, we're going to want to know that.
And it waited until 1818.
So Lindsay, thank you. This was really interesting. I can't wait to see Napoleon and compare notes. And for the rest of you, we'll see you next week for another important edition of Listening to America.
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